This paper examines cultural awareness in knowledge transfer to China. The concepts of guanxi and mianzi are fundamentally important in understanding cultural interactions in China. These concepts, generally analyzed at the personal level, are extended here to relationships between firms and with governmental bodies. Our findings suggest that foreign investors in China must be aware of these key concepts and must use their knowledge to establish better institutional connections with locally owned partners and government. Using these concepts to build trust lies at the heart of interactions with local stakeholders including employees, local partners and government officials. Government support and a shared mindset can only be secured when mutual trust is established. This has to be achieved by long-term engagement with the key actors. #
Introduction
Cultural awareness can be understood as the degree of knowledge about the way of thinking and behaving of people from a different culture. Different contexts in politics, economics, and society have shaped people's conceptions of culture in international management (Doktor, Tung, & Von Glinow, 1991; . Difficulties often occur between managers and subordinates of the same multinational enterprise (MNE) who are from different cultures because of basic differences in how individuals respond to one another's behavior (Shaw, 1990) . This can be further complicated by the cultural diversities and organizational complexities outside the MNE in the host country, termed task environment by Thompson (1967) . Foreign firms are often disadvantaged in comparison to host firms due to gaps in understanding the host culture (Calhoun, 2002) . The handling of cultural diversities inside and outside the firm can affect technology transfer (Tung, 1994) and firm performance (Darby, 1995; Li & Karakowsky, 2002; Marcoulides & Heck, 1993) . Indeed, the ability to manage cultural differences is seen as an example of a firm's sustainable competitive advantage (Oliver, 1997) .
Knowledge transfer has been widely regarded as the key to subsidiary survival in foreign markets (Buckley, Clegg, & Tan, 2004; Inkpen, 1995) . Traditional research mainly focuses on the transfer of technology and management skills (Davidson & McFetridge, 1985; Grosse, 1996) . Recently, an increasing number of studies have extended this research theme onto the transfer of social knowledge and organizational culture (Bhagat, Kedia, Harveston, & Triandis, 2002) . We argue that the transfer of corporate norms, routines and common understandings are pivotal to successful knowledge absorption and dissemination. Knowledge transfer has been an articulated target set by the Chinese government since the opening of its vast domestic market. Success in knowledge transfer and localization depends on the business strategy of the foreign entrant and teamwork between foreign and local partners (Buckley, Clegg, & Tan, 2003) . As cultural differences directly impact on behavioral management practices in the process of knowledge transfer (Inkpen, 1995; Tung, 1994) , MNEs have to grasp Chinese culture in order to improve their performance.
Whilst many studies have demonstrated the benefits of being culturally literate in complex or volatile institutional environments (Boyacigiller, Kleinberg, Phillips, & Sackmann, 2004; Shenkar, 2004) , the importance of cultural awareness in the process of knowledge transfer has not been fully examined (Bhagat et al., 2002; Jackson, 2001; OforiDankwa & Ricks, 2000) . In particular, for MNEs, ways to improve cultural awareness in managing knowledge transfer is a challenge. In this paper, this issue is addressed based on the experiences of four foreign invested firms in China. Two key issues, guanxi and mianzi, are examined in the Chinese business environment. We develop an integrated view on the interaction between internal and external stakeholders and create a framework of cultural engagement for long-term successful performance. Using knowledge transfer as the centerpiece of the empirical work, we also examine the operationalization of guanxi and mianzi in practice.
In the following sections, the relevant literature is reviewed to identify the gaps in respect of cultural awareness with special reference to knowledge transfer to China. In accordance with Yin (1994) , who recommended that case studies should first identify theoretical framework or propositions, a theoretical model is derived to explain the management of cultural awareness in knowledge transfer to China. Next, a profile of the four foreign invested firms is presented and the research methods employed are introduced. Then, the empirical findings are discussed. Finally, the contribution of this research is evaluated and areas for future study suggested.
Literature review

Cultural characteristics in China
Culture is defined as shared norms, values and assumptions (Schein, 1996) . There is a large body of literature on Chinese culture (e.g., Lovett, Simmons, & Kali, 1999; Luo, 1997; Tsang, 1998; Vanhonacker, 2004; Xin & Pearce, 1996) . Chinese culture is considered to be different from that of the West in many ways (Chen & Francesco, 2000; Child & Lu, 1996; Tung, 1986) . Characteristics of Chinese culture, such as family orientation, guanxi, relational interdependence, face, favor and harmony are found to have an influence on MNE's relationship cultivation strategies (Hung, 2004; Paik & Tung, 1999) .
Guanxi (personal connections) and mianzi (face) are the most prominent cultural characteristics that have strong implications for interpersonal and inter-organizational dynamics (e.g., Child & Lu, 1996; Tung & Worm, 2001; Xin & Pearce, 1996; Yeung & Tung, 1996) . Guanxi is an inseparable part of the Chinese business environment. It is a fundamental web of interpersonal relations permeating Chinese societies. Guanxi-based business practices can reduce uncertainty, lower search and other transaction costs, provide usable resources and a sense of connectedness (Wellman, Chen, & Dong, 2002) . For foreign investors, guanxi relationships provide informal ways to reduce environmental uncertainty and opportunistic behavior (Standifird & Marshall, 2000) . Foreign entrants should mount sustained efforts to build up guanxi to give them a competitive edge in their search for an insider position in the China business arena. Guanxi can be a negative asset, however, if not well managed within and between foreign and local firms (Vanhonacker, 2004) . While it is vital to adopt the guanxi approach in their relationships with Chinese partners, foreign investors should be aware that guanxi alone cannot eliminate threats and competition (Fock & Woo, 1998) .
Mianzi is an equally important concept in Chinese culture. It is defined as the recognition by others of an individual's social standing and position (Lockett, 1988) . In Chinese culture, it is not only important to maintain good relationships but also vital to protect a person's mianzi or dignity and prestige. The need for mianzi is intrinsic to various aspects of personal and interpersonal relationship development in China. Saving mianzi is a shortcut by Chinese to build their network and tapping into other's social resources. Thus, mianzi is a key component in the dynamics of guanxi (Sherriff, Lorna, & Stephen, 1999) . Saving mianzi has to go hand in hand with nurturing guanxi. They operate on a reciprocal basis, i.e., all parties of a business relationship must show respect to, and save mianzi for, each other.
National culture can influence the development of trust (Doney, Cannon, & Mullen, 1998; Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 1996) . In the context of China, developing guanxi and saving mianzi create trust between partners (Luo, Shenkar, & Nyaw, 2002; Xin & Pearce, 1996) . Due to uncertainties in the business environment and possible opportunistic behaviors of partners, trust is regarded as one of the most important managerial issues of the corporate agenda (Buckley & Casson, 1988; Inkpen & Currall, 1998; Lui & Ngo, 2004) . Ellis (1996) suggests that building trust between partners in strategic alliances is one of the critical components for the long-term success of the relationship. The potential benefits of trust include reliable and open information exchange, improved coordination and less bureaucratic cost of unified governance (Ebers, 1997) . Although guanxi is often said to be the source of sustained competitive advantage for foreign companies doing business in China (Tsang, 1998) , trust has to be nurtured and maintained to reduce risks and afford better business control in unstable environmental conditions (Xin & Pearce, 1996) .
Cultural awareness between partners
Harrigan (1985) argued that international alliances fail because operating managers did not make them work, not because contracts were poorly written. Tung (1994, p. 821 ) also found that ''a major cause for expatriate failure is the lack of human relational skills''. Based on an extensive case study of Shanghai Volkswagen and Beijing Jeep, Hoon-Halbauer (1999) examined the complex relationships between parents, between headquarters and the joint ventures and between foreign and local staff. Cultural differences are identified as one of the main roots for the complexity and conflicts of the relationships. Kogut and Singh (1988) and Brannen and Salk (2000) argued that national culture can influence the behavior of managers and contribute to potential conflicts between partners. Partners also have to consider the existence of subcultures in the same firm, based on which informal networks develop (Sackmann, 1992) . Informal networks can be a base of power in parallel to formal organizational structure (Krackhardt, 1990) . Thus, misunderstandings often happen between partners due to a lack of culture awareness (Inkpen & Currall, 1998) . Indeed, the existence of different national cultures and subcultures (Caulkins, 2004) in organizations can have a positive or negative impact on firm performance. For example, as long as perceptions of goal congruence are maintained, local culture will contribute to improvement in organizational integration and firm performance (Fischer, Ferreira, Assmar, Redford, & Harb, 2005; Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983) .
Prior relationships between partners appear to negate some complexities arising from cultural differences (Park & Ungson, 1997) . Partly, this can be attributed to the establishment of trust. Trust can lower transaction costs, facilitate inter-organizational relationships, and enhance manager-subordinate relationships. The establishment of trust is a potent force in overcoming the otherwise adverse reactions that employees may exhibit in reaction to decisions yielding unfavorable outcomes (Brockner et al., 1997) .
In the context of China, the establishment of a positive inter-partner working relationship is critical to the venture's operation. This inter-partner relationship refers to the quality of co-operation and trust between the partners while co-managing the joint venture (JV) (Yan & Gray, 1996) . As Chinese culture is heavily influenced by Taoist principles, guanxi and mianzi are regarded to have their Yin and Yang (Durlabhji, 2004) . Eagerness, aggressiveness and outcome orientation (Yang) must be balanced by long-termness, coordination and people orientation (Yin) in the process of trust building. Otherwise, either side of a relationship can be responsible for trust destruction. In extreme cases, those ruthlessly pursuing their goals without regard to what others think can be accused of being ''thick face'' and ''black heart'' (Chu, 1992; Pheng, 1997) . Foreign investors have to engage with the Chinese business environment by embracing guanxi and mianzi to establish and enhance inter-partner relationships based on trust , but ways to improve cultural awareness in order to facilitate knowledge transfer have not been researched.
The role of the party and the government in China
The Chinese government has long played two incompatible roles in its economy: an industry regulatory role and an ownership role in SOEs (Buckley, Clegg, & Tan, 2005) . Since China's transition from a central command system to a market economy, the Chinese government began to reduce its role in running business entities. The Chinese government still influences the decision making process of SOEs through its control of key resources and its power to appoint and dismiss managers (Groves, Hong, McMillan, & Naughton, 1995; Martinsons, 1999) . Even though less intense than previously, ''State paternalism remains a dominant feature of China's business environment'' (Child & Tse, 2001, p. 17) . Moreover, it retains powers to change the rules of the business system and to differentiate its policies towards firms of different categories (Child & Tse, 2001) . This is exemplified in Sino-foreign joint ventures. Aiello (1991) examined the relationship between foreign and local partners of Beijing Jeep and the role of government in the control and operations of this firm. It highlights the weakness of the joint venture relationship and the rigidity of host government control.
A key problem is that both central and local governments perform regulatory and participating roles that are not always consistent with each other (Walder, 1995) . Foreign investors therefore need to maintain communications with different levels of government to be well informed of the changing rules and policies. Given China's lengthy history of bureaucratic control, foreign firms have to be aware of the rules governing the interaction between foreign invested firms and the government. Foreign managers need to ''recognize systemic and/or cultural factors in their [Chinese] environment that cannot be overtly challenged'' (Roehrig, 1994, p. 12) . Typical Confucian values, such as respect for age and hierarchy, avoidance of conflict and the need for harmony, and protection of mianzi (Fang, 1999) , must be taken as central to managing interactions with local and central governments. As policy outcomes and regulatory process are largely determined at local levels through bargaining between foreign investors and local government authorities (Roehrig, 1994) , foreign managers may find it in their own interest to cultivate their enterprise's personal relationship with relevant Chinese officials to create a facilitating environment and to obtain an optimal result from bargaining.
Knowledge transfer to China
The bulk of the literature on knowledge transfer is focused on developed countries. Comparable levels of economic development between developed countries mean that the research is largely based on studies of knowledge transfer within organizations. In the transition economies, researchers must grapple with knowledge transfer within a setting where institutional and cultural factors play an important role in deciding corporate performance (Luo, 2002) . The existing literature therefore does not relate well to knowledge transfers to transition economies that are at a lower stage of development coupled with diverse cultural and institutional differences. Among the existing studies, Tung (1994) established that societal culture was the most important determinant of success in technology transfer from industrialized to developing countries. Fabry and Zeghni (2003) argued that knowledge transfer to transition economies involved extensive cross-cultural adaptation to promote organizational learning and develop specific relationships within affiliates. However, how to manage cross-cultural adaptation has not been properly examined. In particular, little is known about the effectiveness of cross-border transfer of organizational knowledge involving dissimilar cultural contexts (Bhagat et al., 2002) .
China has been the research subject in knowledge transfer in a number of studies (e.g., Buckley et al., 2003; Osterloh & Frey, 2000; Si & Bruton, 1999; Tsang, 1999) . Tsang (1999) argued that FDI represented the transfer of a firm's physical and organizational technologies from the home country to another country. Foreign affiliates in China are expected to undertake efficient organizational learning based on a good understanding of the manner and mindset of the local partners. Marcotte and Niosi (2000) found that tacit knowledge constitutes a substantial part of the total knowledge transferred by Canadian firms to China. The nonexplicit nature of knowledge leaves room for numerous problems of interpretation, not only at the technical and managerial level, but also at the more global level of national culture and institutions. An equity JV is the vehicle of choice for firms seeking transfer of tacit, embedded knowledge (Shenkar & Li, 1999) . Overcoming cultural constraints and nurturing a sound partner relationship is vital for success of knowledge transfer (Si & Bruton, 1999) . Similarly, Buckley et al. (2003) found that while technologies were ranked highly in knowledge seeking by local partners, knowledge of a tacit nature was more important in making the transferred technologies work efficiently. A lack of understanding of the task environment, including the surrounding society's values and mindsets, contributed to lower performance in knowledge transfer and localization (Allaire, 1984) . Clearly, it is well recognized that some types of knowledge are more difficult to transfer between firms because they are more deeply embedded, and highly dependent on broader contextual factors to operate effectively. Given the diversity and complexity of the Chinese business environment, even for explicit knowledge to be transferred and absorbed, cultural barriers have to be removed and good inter-partner relationships have to be established. Strategies to achieve this goal in the knowledge transfer process remain unexplored. We tackle this weakness in the literature by examining four cases of knowledge transfer to China.
2.5. Managing cultural awareness in China: a proposed model Previous literature has emphasized guanxi and to a much lesser extent, mianzi, as means of managing in China. Some of this literature has concentrated on relationships with external bodies and local JV partners. Other parts of it have emphasized relationships with central and local governments. A final strand concerns the management of employees. Our contribution is to place these literatures together in an integrated model and to go on to confront this model with empirical evidence and to refine it.
Research method
This paper is exploratory and seeks to fill an identified gap in the literature. It employs a multiplecase design (Yin, 1994) with research questions centered on the ''how'' and ''why'' of knowledge transfer in the emerging market of China. This approach enables us to generate new theoretical concepts grounded in case and cross-case analysis (Herriott & Firestone, 1983; Wright, 2004) .
Data collection
In identifying potential research candidates, MNEs that had been operating in China for a period of at least five years were chosen (Inkpen, 1995, p. 129) . Thirtynine companies met the criteria, roughly half in each of the two industries, were contacted in order to seek permission for interviews. Twelve firms responded positively which enabled the pilot fieldwork to be conducted. As a result, four firms were identified for further research (see Table 1 for a profile of the four firms). As final assemblers, these firms engaged in greater knowledge transfer than the other firms. Two rounds of both open-ended and semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted using multiple interviewees in each company. The interviewees were senior executives, including those responsible for functional units such as business planning, marketing, finance, production and human resources. Some of the top managers experienced the whole process of negotiation on establishing the foreign invested firms and attended numerous discussions on facilitating knowledge transfer and localization. The majority of the senior executives had at least ten years' employment in their respective firms, and participated in the process of knowledge transfer. Members of the knowledge transfer team, such as the training manager, operational manager, project engineer and other technical professionals, were also interviewed. As the interviewees consisted of both foreign expatriates and Chinese, the English version of the questionnaire was carefully translated into Chinese. Back translation, as suggested by Brislin (1970) , was carried out to verify the content consistency between the two versions of the questionnaire.
Data coding
Interview data and field notes were coded using content analysis procedures (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Strauss, 1987) . This involved coding data into categories in line with the context of foreign cultural interaction with the host environment. These categories comprised the milestones of these companies, main technologies transferred, cultural interaction with employees, local partners, other local firms, and central and local governments. These data were then structured to address the research issues identified (Yin, 1994) , including guanxi, mianzi, trust and other cultural characters exhibited. Emerging themes were further pursued to extract leads for understanding of managing cultural awareness in the four case companies (Fig. 2) .
Data analysis
Data analysis in this research followed closely the procedures set for interpreting qualitative data (East- erby-Smith, Thorpe, & Lowe, 1991; Strauss, 1987) in general, and those for case study methodology (Yin, 1994) in particular. The interviews were analyzed to focus on the cultural dimensions in knowledge transfer. Using a ''within-case'' analysis, theory was first developed by examining the context of cultural interactions in one case. Then, pattern matching (Miles & Huberman, 1984; Yin, 1994 ) was adopted to compare the finding from this first case with the other three. Cross referencing between interviews, and between primary data and secondary data, were carried out to establish connections among factors and further verify the validity of these data by triangulation. This constituted an emergent process in constructing grounded inter- pretations of the collected data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) and elicited implications on issues relevant to the topic under research based on ''analytical generalization'' (Yin, 1994) . Case write-ups were made available for circulation among leading participants to verify overall accuracy.
Findings
Our interview data suggest that the four foreign invested firms transferred knowledge to China through an episodic process of learning and utilization. Many factors contributed to achieving better performance in this process, including culture awareness, shared mindsets, government support and long-term vision.
Cultural awareness
Cultural awareness includes the understanding of both traditional Chinese culture and the behavior of Chinese people, and more importantly, China's political system. Guanxi and mianzi are regarded as the core of Chinese culture (Child & Lu, 1996) . The effective development and use of guanxi and respect of mianzi is seen as a requirement for the successful establishment of new business ventures and for the effective day-today management of Chinese enterprises. Alcatel Bell agreed to establish Shanghai Bell with the then Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (hereafter the ''Ministry'', which was replaced by Ministry of Information Industry in 2003), though the official Chinese parent of this JV is the Post and Telecommunications Industry Corporation of China (PTIC) which was under control of the Ministry. This was a wise move for Alcatel Bell because it could guarantee the proper implementation of the JV contract and elicit substantial government support. Alcatel Bell's expatriates were also quick to realize the importance of maintaining ''guanxi'' with their Chinese partners. One piece of evidence is their understanding and cooperation in receiving hundreds of visitors annually ranging from Shanghai Bell, Shanghai Bell's suppliers and customers (i.e., local bureaus of post and telecommunications), the Ministry and other governmental officials, to Belgium in the name of inspecting new products or for attending short ''training courses''. As there was hardly any need for them to go to Belgium from a technical point of view, these sightseeing-natured visits were used as a way of rewarding employees by the Chinese partner. It was of great benefit to Alcatel Bell's guanxi building when judging it from a business point of view. Culturally, it was prestigious to visit the West at the invitation of a high-profile international firm which could give mianzi to these officials and their respective employers. Receiving these numerous Chinese delegations greatly enhanced Alcatel Bell's guanxi.
The other three firms also manifested a similar quality of being culturally aware in the Chinese market. For example, Motorola sent in an American Chinese as the first general manager of its China operation. It also adopted a fast track management localization plan, put housing allocation at the core of its employee benefit system (which did not exist in any other subsidiary of the firm), and donated scholarships and financial resources to various educational establishment. Chrysler also developed a sense of cultural awareness through its interaction with Chinese partners. It transferred the then most advanced model into the JV in a response to the plea of Chinese partners, therefore giving mianzi to the majority local partner. This was highly appreciated by the local Chinese partners and guanxi between them improved significantly. While conflicts and mistrust between foreign and local employees existed due to fundamental cultural differences (Hoon-Halbauer, 1999), VW did manage to show considerable cultural awareness in its dealing with the Chinese government. It enlisted the support of the German government in persuading the Chinese government to agree to the establishment of a JV with a 50:50 equity structure in 1984; the highest equity stake up to this date. This was bolstered by a large German government grant towards training local Chinese employees. The firm was an active sponsor of major sports events, of educational institutions, and of various projects for helping the poor in inland areas of China. This was intended to establish itself as a responsible corporate citizen. Shanghai VW was the largest business project between China and Germany, receiving unparalleled attention and support from both governmentsindicated by numerous personal visits of national signatories from each side. This is an excellent example of promoting guanxi between the two partners of the JV through the governments of the two countries. This string of facts indicates that cultural awareness should be a key component of the business strategy of MNEs entering the Chinese market.
Trust
Trust between partners is the foundation of cooperation. It comprises technical trust and personal trust (Chang & Rosenzweig, 1995) . In the case of Shanghai Bell, the Belgian partner moved from suspicion to full confidence in the technical capability of their Chinese counterpart.
''The Chinese engineers in Shanghai Bell are first class. They are not inferior to any engineers in the West.'' (Belgian senior manager) Due to technical capabilities of the Chinese engineers, they participated in the refining and modification of the transferred product from Alcatel Bell in accordance with Chinese circumstances. A R&D center owned by Shanghai Bell was also set up in Belgium, just neighboring Alcatel Bell. It worked on projects subcontracted by Alcatel Bell. This subsidiary also served as a product design department for Shanghai Bell.
Similar examples were available in the other three firms, e.g., the increasing contribution of Chinese engineers in Beijing Jeep in the assimilation and modification of the off-road range from Chrysler, the establishment and further expansion of R&D centers in China by both Motorola and VW. The four firms regarded highly the technical capability of Chinese engineers they employed. This reflected the great improvement in Chinese higher education since the end of the 1970s.
Personal trust was also engineered at different levels in the affiliate firm, especially among managers and engineers. Management localization programs in Motorola and other three JVs were clear evidence of the confidence held by foreign investors in their Chinese colleagues. This was a result of numerous meetings and consultations in the process of knowledge transfer. Personal trust can also be established from a situation where equal power sharing made personal trust essential to keep the company functioning. In Shanghai VW, where the equity was shared equally by the Chinese and the German partners, each of the four members of Shanghai VW's executive committee had the power to handicap the operation of the whole company by vetoing any proposed motions. Therefore, compromises based on mutual trust and saving mianzi were the way to achieve the overall goals of the firm. This confirms Casson's (1991) argument that the ambiguity of control created by a certain type of ownership structure can be used to engineer trust. Even if the foreign partner's equity holding was less than 50%, it could impose far greater bargaining power in negotiation due to its advantageous position deriving from proprietary assets. The foreign partner could exercise influence by withholding knowledge transfer, changing technical criteria and withdrawing expatriates, for instance. The Chinese partner with majority control, in each case, had to make compromises in exchange for the continuous support of the foreign counterpart in providing proprietary assets. Therefore, the non-equity bargaining power enjoyed by foreign partners in the JVs made trust a more important factor in attaining efficiency of knowledge transfer and utilization. Trust has thus extended from personal trust between foreign and local managers to inter-organizational trust between foreign and local partners.
Shared mindsets
Shared mindsets indicate that partners of a JV have a common understanding on aspects concerning the development of the firm. It is gained not only in the course of negotiation in the JV, but also after facing challenges arising from internal operational problems. Lack of a shared mindset can derail the undertaking of the agreed knowledge transfer program, pushing the whole business into crisis. This was vividly illustrated in the case of Beijing Jeep's foreign exchange shortage during 1986-1987. This incident arose from a lack of foreign exchange in the JV to pay for imported components from the foreign parent, which lead to misunderstanding and mistrust between foreign and local partners. Chrysler later refrained from sending back all its profits to its headquarters for a few years in order to help find some time in solving this issue. The Chinese side also realized the importance of communication with the foreign partner. As a result, mutual trust was created based on a shared mindset for making this JV a competitive operator in the Chinese market.
''The whole-hearted support and active participation of the American side has been the cornerstone of the success of Beijing Jeep's localization. They have been very supportive and considerate in each stage of localization, i.e. transfer and assimilation of technology, ordering and testing of the imported equipment, quality control, upgrading and renovating of certain parts of the design and production, and so on. In Shanghai Bell, however, Belgian managers showed great flexibility and understanding from the very beginning. The marketing performance of Shanghai Bell was in a poor state in the middle of the 1980s due to cost and technical problems. Belgian managers did everything they could to push the business back on track based on their own expertise in technology and management. At the same time, they sought the sympathy and support from the host government which subsequently decided to subsidize products from Shanghai Bell. This experience, which resulted in greater cooperation to solve the problem, enabled the two sides to work together even more harmoniously since then. Similar evidence can be found in Shanghai VW where both sides shared a belief in making the Santana the best car in the Chinese market. They negotiated on the scale and speed of technology transfer and argued on the issue of quality control. However, these were conducted based on mutual trust and understanding. Shanghai VW has maintained its role of China's largest car manufacturer since its inception.
A shared mindset was also important in a whollyowned subsidiary, but it was demonstrated in a different way. Owing to the sole control of the parent, there was an internal process in working out differences between headquarters and Chinese subsidiaries. For example, business strategies were drawn first by its China headquarters in Beijing and then revised and added to by its headquarters in the USA. Therefore, they were a product of internal coordination through constant communications. Both headquarters and local subsidiary contributed to the formation of Motorola's strategies in China.
In sum, a shared mindset is a key aspect contributing to the success of foreign invested firms in China. In essence, a shared mindset is trust between foreign and local firms. This can be achieved through active guanxi building and respect of the mianzi of each side. In this sense, relationships between firms in China can be nurtured by following the same cultural doctrines as at personal level.
Government support
Government support can decide the success of foreign invested firms in China. It proved to be the lifeblood of Shanghai Bell in the early years of operation when the firm struggled for survival and to maintain on-going knowledge transfer. This is also a factor in the recent development of Shanghai Bell. To date, Chinese governmental agencies are still the primary purchasers of Shanghai Bell's products.
''Government support is very, very important. Without government support from both countries, we can do nothing. That is partly the reason why Alcatel Bell preferred to hold minority equity in Shanghai Bell-in this way the Belgian side could get concrete local [Chinese] government support. As this project was listed as one of the key national projects, it has always enjoyed the endorsement of the Chinese government. The Ministry of Post & Telecommunications even set up a special Bureau, called System 1240 Bureau, for the development of this project . . .'' (Senior manager, Alcatel Bell) Government support received by Shanghai Bell from the Belgian government mainly comprised interest free loans, free training programs (technical and management) for Chinese engineers and managers, and intergovernmental co-ordination. Issues like technology transfer licenses governed by relevant European dual use agreements, which the firm could do nothing about, are examples of inter-governmental co-ordination.
Government support was cited as the chief external factor affecting knowledge transfer and utilization in the other three firms. Unlike Shanghai Bell where both central and local governments were direct stakeholders, local governments played a key role in the establishment of these firms. Due to the size and importance of these firms, the local governments (Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin) regarded the development of Shanghai VW, Beijing Jeep and Motorola (China), respectively, as the locomotive of local economic development. Projects to upgrade and expand these firms were made priorities of the cities, sometimes named as ''No. 1 project'' in various years. Local governments in these cities also encouraged the formation of localization communities, members of which can get access to special government funding, technical assistance and tax relief, to speed up assimilation and upgrading of the transferred products. Government procurement of their products was sometimes guaranteed for certain period. Government support of this nature ensured the allocation of much needed resources to these firms, the opening of local markets to their products and, most importantly, the provision of a high status.
''We enjoyed some special treatment from government, such as exempt of tax for the first two years and half tax rate for the following three years, special access in using foreign exchange which was very important at the beginning of this joint venture.'' (Senior manager, Shanghai VW)
To date, Chinese government support has been selective but nevertheless powerful when FDI falls into the designated priority categories of the host local governments. The importance of government support indicates that foreign investors must pay particular attention to macro-environmental factors when doing business in China (Yip, 1995) .
To seek government support, foreign invested firms should endeavor to set up personal relationships with government officials and offer legitimate support to give mianzi to government. Relationship building with the government in China is essentially a two-way process based on effective communications. Examples of this are Shanghai Bell's technical and management training for local firms, and its repeated donations to charitable causes such as Project Hope, Shanghai VW's technical assistance to other state-owned enterprises in the automotive industry at the request of government, Beijing Jeep's donation of its products to the Beijing Municipal Government and the Military, and Motorola (China)'s free training and seminars for governmental officials of the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications. In fact, the relationship with government was so important that each of the four firms set up a department named ''Government Relations'' in its China headquarters specially mandated to deal with various government organizations. Former government officials or relatives of current officials were recruited to ensure access to key government officials so that an active communication channel could be maintained. Visits by CEOs of foreign parents to China were always an opportunity to promote good relationships with the government. Therefore, high profile meetings with top government officials (such as vice premier or at least ministers) were seen as a must. Commitments from both sides regarding ambitious new investment plans and further government support were declared after meetings of this kind. These meetings, as well as other similar occasions, were often used by foreign investors to lobby the government.
As a result of these efforts, these firms were successful in creating a favorable task environment for doing business, a strengthened capability for localization and a growing customer base in their respective markets. Good guanxi with the government in China also means creating a favorable operating environment by avoiding excessive government inference. This supports the argument made by Roehrig (1994) . It is an important strategy for foreign invested firms to elicit favorable implementation of laws, rules, regulations, and policies from local authorities and to establish good, personal relationships with strategically-located individuals in business, government, and bureaucracy. This is because they may be able to influence the outcomes of possible future questions and disputes in favor of the enterprise.
Long-term vision
All the firms showed a common characteristiclong-term vision -in dealing with the challenges and problems in the process of knowledge transfer. For example, one senior manager of Shanghai VW repeatedly emphasized the following point.
''Our strategy is to seek long-term engagement with the Chinese market. We want to stay here long and grow along with the market expansion. Even though there may be numerous problems emerging every day, we are confident about the long-term prospect, at least not less than our Chinese partner. This has shaped our business strategy and even our mentality.'' Evidence of long-term vision includes the gradual increase of the foreign equity holding in Beijing Jeep and Shanghai Bell and the reinvestment of all the profits into production and training in the initial period of their developments. Alcatel increased its equity holding from 32% to 50% plus one extra voting stock, making Shanghai Bell a majority owned subsidiary. Likewise, Chrysler increased its equity in Beijing Jeep from 31% to 42.5%. All the four firms invested new capital and reinvested earnings over several years into production expansion, demonstrating their long-term interest in the Chinese market. For example, Motorola (China) had not only invested US$ 1.2 billion of new capital in China and reinvested all its profits from its Chinese operations back into the country, but also invested an additional US$ 1.3 billion by the end of 2000. When asked about the secret of Motorola's successful operation in China, one senior manager commented very briefly, in four words: heart, mutual trust and patience.
Long-term vision may not be a characteristic enjoyed by every foreign investor, but it is a prerequisite for success in dealing with the Chinese market. This is partly due to the complications of the Chinese market where foreign investors have to learn to manage. It is also rooted in the Chinese culture which appreciates long-term engagement so that people can cultivate mutual understanding and nurture trust. This again reflects the importance of guanxi building in the Chinese context which has been observed at personal and inter-organizational levels and with government.
Discussion
5.1. Extension of guanxi, mianzi and trust to corporate and governmental relationships Guanxi and mianzi are predominant cultural characteristics associated with inter-personal relationships in China. The experiences of the four firms indicate that these cultural characteristics are extended into relationships between business partners and with the government. From face-to-face negotiations to maintenance of the commercial relationship, foreign investors interact with the Chinese environment through people. It is therefore important to establish guanxi and give mianzi on reciprocal basis when dealing with Chinese, be they employees, managers of related firms or government officials. This will lead to the establishment of trust which can save transaction cost and reduce uncertainty (Park & Harrison, 1993) . The purpose of relationship building with the Chinese environment is to nurture trust. This cannot be achieved in a short period. Instead, it is a result of long-term engagement through ''local networking'' . Alcatel Bell's courting of Chinese partners by receiving large number of visitors, Motorola and VW's extensive training cooperation with government, and Chrysler's transfer of latest technology are examples of relationship cultivation. Relationship building with business and government in China based on guanxi and mianzi can enhance foreign investors' chance of constructing a favorable environment and strengthen their bargaining position in dealing with the government. They can also influence the decision making in government through active lobbying. In fact, the four firms all received government support of various kinds in their post-entry development as a result of their guanxi building.
Managing cultural awareness in China: refining the model
Based on our analysis of the four case firms, the initial model can be improved by integrating the key dimensions of relationship building in the Chinese context. It is clear that foreign investors should recognize the key role played by guanxi and mianzi in Chinese culture and seek to establish a trust-based relationship when interacting with the host environment. At the personal level, foreign investors need to establish personal as well as technical trust in Chinese employees based on active communications and respect of mianzi. Likewise, at the corporate level, guanxi building and respect of mianzi should be applied to seek shared mindsets, an equivalent of trust between partners. Foreign investors should also treat government as an important partner instead of a rival when operating in China. Active communication channels should be set up between foreign invested firm and government based on personal guanxi and personal trust. Foreign investors can use this channel to inform and lobby government. They also need to behave as a corporate citizen through subscription to various social and charitable programs supported by government. In essence, foreign investors have given government mianzi in participating in these activities. The purpose of this engagement is to construct an enabling environment and to seek government support. The latter can often decide the outcome of foreign operations in China. Finally, Chinese culture appreciates trust but only when nurtured through long-term engagement. Foreign firms thus need to design their business and knowledge transfer strategies with a long-term vision (see Fig. 3 ).
Conclusions
Previous studies on doing business in China examined the complexity of relationships within joint ventures and with government and cultural differences were identified as an important issue (e.g., Aiello, 1991; Hoon-Halbauer, 1999) . None of them offered guidance on how to adopt the concept of cultural awareness in daily business operations. This paper examined the most prominent Chinese cultural elements, guanxi and mianzi. It contributes to knowledge by presenting an integrated approach to the handling of relationships with employees, business partners and government based on guanxi and mianzi in the context of China. Our findings suggested that foreign investors must be aware of guanxi and mianzi of the institutions they dealt with and better establish institutional connections based on personal connections with local partners and government. Foreign investors can use this channel of communications to inform and lobby local and central governments. Trust lies at the heart of the interactions between foreign investors and local stakeholders including employees, local partners and government. Shared mindset and government support can only be secured when there is trust between the parties. Therefore, the essence of relationship building and managing cultural awareness is to establish trust. This has to be achieved by long-term engagement in the context of China.
Based on our case evidence, the model of managing cultural awareness in China at three levels is proposed and refined: personal, inter-partner and with government. This model establishes the central role of trust in relationship building in China. It becomes more dynamic after integrating the long-term view in engaging the Chinese market. This is a new contribution to doing business in China.
This paper has implications for research into FDI located in transitional economies. First, cultural awareness is an issue worthy of representation in firm's business strategy. It can affect knowledge transfer and firm performance (Darby, 1995) . Foreign investors need to take a comprehensive view in dealing with stakeholders in the host country based on understanding of local culture. Second, trust is at the core of relationship building at personal, corporate and governmental levels. It is more difficult to establish trust with local partners and government due to differences in business orientations and organizational culture. Cultural literacy and a long-term commitment can help in securing trust between organizations. Last, government is not always a restrictive force. If a close relationship can be set up based on personal trust and respect of mianzi, government support can be sought and its policy making influenced. This will create an enabling institutional environment for foreign investors.
Given the similarity of the institutional environment in other transitional markets, future research could explore ways of managing cultural awareness in these countries. In the context of China, more research is needed to look at how firms turn the bad guanxi to good and how to handle situations where good guanxi turns bad. This applies to relationships between joint venture partners and with government. As a result of the rapid changes and developments since China's accession into the World Trade Organization, further research should also look at the changing Chinese culture as a whole: Is it leaning towards individualism? If so, what is the impact on managing cultural difference in this country? This research is limited by its small number of case companies. Surveys based on large sample investigation should be adopted to test the validity of the cultural awareness model proposed in this paper.
